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The issue of human consciousness, in both its popular and neuroscientific sense, is considered from a clinical perspective. The
ictal semiologies of the various epilepsies, together with associated clinical features, are demonstrated to highlight certain neu-
roanatomical and neurophysiological facets of consciousness. It is suggested that further insights into consciousness, even those
bordering on the philosophical, may be led by clinical neurological phenomena and emerging neuroinvestigative techniques.
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INTRODUCTION
The neurologist often savours the intellectual privi-
lege of his habitual dealings with the human nervous
system. While much remains to be discovered about
the human brain, many of its astounding capabilities
are plainly manifest. One is its capacity to generate
consciousness—the ability to sense the environment
and display goal-directed behaviour; to think, to feel,
and ultimately to cogitate on itself. Reflective peo-
ple of all cultures have considered the issue of con-
sciousness; speculations on the subject have histori-
cally come from religious leaders and philosophers. In
recent years, perspectives have been added from fields
as diverse as computer science, linguistics, psychology
and physics. For the clinician, the study of cognition
in the context of neurological disorders offers several
unique avenues for inquiry and speculation. In this ar-
ticle, the pathophysiological richness of the epilepsies
is illustrated as one such avenue.
EPILEPSY AND CONSCIOUSNESS
SELECTED EARLY WRITINGS
John Hughlings Jackson wrote on epilepsy for over
forty years (1861–1902). While his name is com-
monly associated with the definition of ‘seizure’ and
an eponymous seizure type, he saw much further:
‘. . . A carefully observed convulsion . . . as an anatom-
ical and physiological experiment, although a rough
one, on part of the brain’1. For him, the different
seizure semiologies illuminated the functional topog-
raphy of the brain: ‘. . . although the functional alter-
ation is the same in all epilepsies, the seats of those
functional alterations are various’. While unaware of
the anatomical basis of temporal lobe epilepsy, he
noted the ‘reminiscences’, ‘volumnious mental states’
and ‘dreamy states’ of some of his epileptic patients.
When, years later, some of these patients came to au-
topsy, he described identifiable temporal lobe pathol-
ogy; thereon, he denoted such seizures as ‘uncinate
fits’. In historical terms, the identification of an epilep-
tic state with an altered state of consciousness, and fur-
ther, with disordered brain structure, had begun.
In this century, the seminal work of the Cana-
dian neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield echoed the Jack-
sonian legacy: ‘. . . The epilepsies throw much light
on the mechanisms of the brain’2. In classic elec-
trocorticographical experiments on awake patients
undergoing craniotomy, Penfield described the dif-
ferences between the elementary somatosensory re-
sponses obtained from stimulation in the perirolandic
area from the more complex manifestations (‘psychi-
cal responses’) from the temporoparietal cortices. De-
tailed experiments on over a thousand subjects re-
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vealed common underlying patterns. Stimulation of
temporoparietal cortex of either hemisphere produced
either ‘experiential’ (recall of past events) or ‘interpre-
tive’ (feelings of familiarity, unfamiliarity, fear, and
other emotions) responses. When stimulation in the
deeper temporal lobe (the periamygdaloid areas and
uncus) and the prefrontal cortex was followed by elec-
trical afterdischarge, Penfield also observed absences
and automatisms. An overall analysis of his experi-
ence2 led him to summarize the cerebral topography
of consciousness into two components: (i) localized
specific functions, such as speech, memory and affect,
and (ii) a more diffuse system of awareness and con-
scious integration, centred subcortically (in a region
he termed the ‘centracephalon’). The anatomical sub-
strate for the latter began to be defined from animal ex-
perimental work in the 1940s. Marshall and Magoun3
describe Morison and Dempsey’s early work on iden-
tifying the ‘recruiting response’ of the cortex follow-
ing thalamic stimulation: a diffuse response from large
areas of the cortex was noticed to localized stimuli ap-
plied to the interlaminar nuclei of the cat thalamus.
Herbert Jasper, an associate of Penfield, demonstrated
the striking reproduction of both the electrical4 and
behavioural5 characteristics of ‘petit-mal’ epilepsy by
repetitive stimulation of the intralaminar thalamus.
Moruzzi and Magoun’s experiments6 revealed the ex-
istence of an ‘ascending reticular activating system’.
Penfield’s basic ideas (we shall see) are still fashion-
able today, despite his despondency regarding solving
the mind–body problem in his later years7.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
What exactly do we mean by consciousness? Formally
defining it can be difficult or controversial8, 9; it is
easier to describe the phenomenon and discuss its at-
tributes. Everyone has some notion of what it is to be
conscious, and few would disagree with the following
subjective features10, 11:
• The sense of identity or ‘me’, that pervades and at-
taches itself to percepts and affects—‘I feel pain’,
‘I see red’, etc.;
• ‘Qualia’, i.e. the term introduced by philosophers
to denote the intense and irreduciably personal
sensory experience of percepts—the blueness of
blue, the wetness of water, and so on;
• The possession of an identity and directed cogni-
tive faculties (and an appreciation of that posses-
sion) that exists in the spatiotemporal context of an
orderly external world, that, despite the everchang-
ing flux of mental experience, continues largely
unchanged from day to day and is subject to pre-
dictable laws.
From an objective standpoint, consciousness in-
cludes10:
• An integrated, coherent, controlled character of
behaviour;
• Detection and adaptation to novelty;
• Goal-directed behaviour;
• Use of language;
• Use of certain forms of representation, such as
declarative (i.e. associative) memory;
• Metacognition (i.e. representation of one’s own—
and others’—mental processes).
One of the many challenges of the subject of con-
sciousness is reconciling the subjective and objective
aspects through a unified theory. The issue of qualia
is a favourite: how can the personal experience of the
colour red ever be reduced to the description of neu-
ronal activity? This issue is notoriously difficult, but
it may be that such riddles arise from methodological
and semantic confusion12. In the study of conscious-
ness, much as in other branches of science, particular
care needs to be taken about the conceptual level of
questions before answers can be provided.
How does current neurobiological knowledge mea-
sure up to the above issues? One may argue whether
consciousness will ever be fully ‘solved’, but most
neuroscientists will agree that current and future ad-
vances offer hope. The clinical neurologist is, how-
ever, convinced that consciousness certainly has some-
thing to do with the workings of the brain as we know
it—witness the myriad disorders of consciousness en-
countered in clinical practice.
Let us specifically see what the epilepsies may teach
him.
THE GENERALIZED SEIZURE:
CONSCIOUSNESS VERSUS
UNCONSCIOUSNESS
The most dramatic alteration of consciousness is its
reversible extinction during the course of a general-
ized convulsion. The loss of consciousness during, and
following, such a seizure illustrates the most basic of
differences between the conscious and non-conscious
state, i.e. either being ‘awake’ or not. The evident loss
of perception, goal-directed behaviour, speech, and
other such faculties during nonwakefulness suggests
the first of a series of key facts:
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• Observation 1: Consciousness is hierarchical; the
faculty of ‘wakefulness’ is perhaps its most funda-
mental aspect.
Where might the anatomical seat of wakefulness lie,
and what is its relation to epilepsy? The modern
view13 is that wakefulness, in the absence of substan-
tial cerebral hemispheric pathology, is derived from
the rostral mesencephalic reticular formation. A dor-
sal ascending pathway from there terminates in the
nonspecific thalamic nuclei (i.e. nucleus reticularis, in-
tralaminar nuclei and ventrolateral nuclei) that in turn
projects to widespread cortical areas. A second ventral
pathway projects to the hypothalamus and the basal
forebrain, and further to other distributed cortical ar-
eas. Reciprocal connections exist. Thus, the area of
confluence of the midbrain, the hypothalamus and the
subthalamus, is crucial to the preservation of wakeful-
ness (in the presence of largely intact cerebral hemi-
spheres).
Penfield hypothesized that the alteration of aware-
ness in generalized seizures was due to spread of
the discharge into the ‘diencephalic grey matter’2,
which secondarily projected symmetrically to the rest
of the cortex. A second postulated grey matter sta-
tion carried the cortical discharge caudally, interfering
with the brainstem control of wakefulness and provok-
ing the spasms of the cranial and spinal musculature
characteristic of a tonic–clonic fit. Neurologists today
would probably favour a diffuse hemispheric dysfunc-
tion, rather than focal brainstem dysfunction, as the
cause of loss of consciousness in generalized seizures.
In part, this is due to the recognition of nonconvul-
sive seizures, which appear to be purely supratentorial
events.
However, the message regarding wakefulness is
clear: this is an aspect of consciousness of the cerebral
hemispheres as a whole, in the presence of an intact
brainstem. This leads to
• Observation 2: The ‘wakefulness’ aspect of con-
sciousness is a property of large areas of the brain;
ascending reticular activation modulates this.
GENERALIZED ABSENCES: WAKEFULNESS
AND AWARENESS
Is the awake brain necessarily aware? Certainly not:
witness coma progressing to the persistent vegetative
state, with intact sleep–wake cycles, spontaneous eye-
opening, occasional visual tracking, and inconsistent
affective responses—the brain has woken, but is surely
not aware. In fact, the hair-splitting goes further—we
may distinguish general awareness from conscious
awareness, and further distinguish the faculty of con-
scious self-awareness.
The generalized absence seizure appears to be the
prototypical example of wakefulness with absent,
or reduced, awareness. Like generalized tonic–clonic
seizures, absences are characterized by widespread,
bilateral involvement of the cerebral hemispheres,
but cerebral processes are only interfered with ‘sub-
maximally’14. Despite their typical brevity, general-
ized absences are a rich source of information on
consciousness—they have no identifiable aura or post-
ictal state; the alteration of consciousness is en-
tirely intra-ictal. A generalized absence is character-
ized by a brief (usually seconds) period of under-
responsiveness; there may be a tonic stiffening, but
often an ongoing motor task (especially if habitual),
may continue. Indeed, a novel motor task may be
performed—the patient may use a chair appropriately
if sat down, or may suck at a straw placed in the mouth.
The degree of under-responsiveness varies, but most
patients will be described as ‘inaccessible’ and ‘un-
communicative’ during the episode; even those who
seem normal will have transient identifiable deficits
when cognition is tested formally under EEG con-
trol15.
What happens to consciousness during a generalized
absence? The subject is awake, and must have a cer-
tain ‘automatic’ awareness (to enable motor tasks, for
instance, to continue)—could it be that the cognitive
deficit is largely that of loss (or diminution) of con-
scious awareness?
The modern understanding of primary absence
epilepsy is that due to abnormal thalamocortical
rhythms16; this is in line with current views on thala-
mic neurophysiology. It has been known for centuries
that the thalamus is a major sensory relay station;
this prompted its presumed role as the ‘gatekeeper’
to consciousness. Clinicians have also long known
the effects of bilateral thalamic pathology—loss of
consciousness, with slow, incomplete recovery char-
acterized by diminished responsiveness and altered
behaviour. Experimental evidence for the nonspecific
thalamic nuclei’s diffuse cortical access has been men-
tioned. Modern studies of these projections in animals
have confirmed two remarkable results—repetitive
stimulation of the nonspecific nuclei produces spike-
wave discharges over the cortex accompanying a be-
havioural response reminiscent of absence epilepsy17;
the state of reactivity of the cortex (measured by mus-
cle responses to subthreshold stimuli applied to the
motor strip) can be ‘tuned’ up or down by the level of
nonspecific thalamic afferent input18. In humans, tha-
lamic activation during absence seizures has been ob-
served by functional neuroimaging19. What emerges
is an elegant and unifying concept for generalized ab-
sence epileptogenesis; the nonspecific thalamic effer-
ents to the cortex, in combination with the cortex’s re-
ciprocal connections, control overall cortical reactiv-
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ity; in states of abnormal coupling, the electrical in-
teraction turns into spikewave discharges that signifi-
cantly alter the state of consciousness.
This begs the question: are the nonspecific thalamic
nuclei (in a sense) the ‘seat’ of conscious awareness? It
is difficult to provide an answer in the full philosoph-
ical sense of qualia, but a more limited neurophys-
iological answer can be given, which is: apparently,
yes. Let us examine one (popular) view of conscious-
ness11: this distinguishes between the central core of
consciousness (called property ‘C’), characterized by
the ‘me-ness’, subjectivity, or referral-to-the-self as-
pect, from the contents of consciousness. Based on the
widespread connections of the intralaminar thalamus,
and the effects of its bilateral ablation, Bogen11 hy-
pothesizes that it subserves property C; the contents of
C are provided by neural activity patterns in various
areas of the cortex. For example, the conscious state
of imagining a friend’s face would ‘endow’ property
C with the specific activity from the primary and sec-
ondary visual association areas. Conversely, if C did
not exist, the face of the friend, while possibly invok-
ing subconscious responses, would not ‘reach’ con-
scious awareness. In other words, excluding C from
mental processes deprives them of their subjectivity:
habitual motor activity may continue, but it is devoid
of personal participation.
• Observation 3: The ‘awareness’ of consciousness
resides within ‘wakefulness’; ‘conscious aware-
ness’, in turn, resides within ‘general awareness’
(Observation 1). The nonspecific thalamic nuclei
and their connections appear to be the neurophys-
iological substrates of conscious awareness, which
is the faculty mainly affected in generalized ab-
sence seizures.
COMPLEX PARTIAL SEIZURES: LOCALIZED
CONSCIOUSNESS
The alteration of awareness in complex partial seizures
is well known to the clinical epileptologist; routine
clinical practice even attempts to localize epileptic
foci based on ictal semiology. This suggests that con-
sciousness, in addition to its global nature, must occa-
sionally ‘condense’ onto specific cerebral sites.
The work of Gloor and co-workers20 is one source
of modern data on the effects of stimulation of the
unanaesthetized human cerebral cortex. It had been
known since Penfield that cortical stimulation in the
somatosensory strip produced elementary sensations
(buzzing, temperature change) in definite body parts;
stimulation in Broca’s area produced the more com-
plex phenomenon of speech arrest. Large parts of
the cortex produced no identifiable response. Stimu-
lation of the limbic structures in the temporal lobe
however produced complex effects in Gloor’s awake
patients—intense auras variably combining percep-
tive, mnemonic and affective features. In one exam-
ple, the right amygdala was stimulated. Following the
first brief impulse, the patient responded, saying there
was a feeling as though his face was covered with wa-
ter. Stimulation for longer periods of time uncovered
various other features of this hallucination: he was be-
ing pushed into the water by a ‘big fellow’. After the
stimulation ended, the patient was able to recount the
whole experience—it had happened in his early child-
hood, when he had in fact been chased and pushed
into a pond by a stronger boy. His epileptic halluci-
nation, however, did not carry all that detail (which
he later consciously recalled); the main feature of the
hallucination was the feeling of having been chased,
and the sensation of water covering his face. Thus, the
outstanding feature of experimental phenomena (of-
ten recognized by these patients as identical to their
epileptic auras), is their ‘compelling immediacy’2 to
personal identity—the feeling of ‘being there’, as one
of Gloor’s patients put it.
The main areas in the human brain implicated in
explicit memory (i.e. memory associated with con-
scious recall) are structures in the medial tempo-
ral lobe—hippocampus, amygdala, entorhinal cortex,
perirhinal cortex and parahippocampal cortex—and
the diencephalon—medial thalamus and mammillary
bodies21. Laying down and retrieval of explicit mem-
ory also involves areas in the frontal lobes, which are
thought to organize memories according to their se-
mantic content and context; frontal lobe lesions there-
fore give rise to deficiencies in memory more prop-
erly labelled as semantic and organizational, rather
than ‘amnesic’. Currently accepted views22, 23 on the
laying down of explicit memory stress the impor-
tance of contextual content of the memory; that is,
the spatiotemporal context, the many parallel coexist-
ing sources of information, and the affective content
that surround the memory target. The memory, while
being laid down, is thus ‘bound’ to its conceptual
and affective content; the binding being perhaps per-
formed by amygdala and hippocampus on the basis
of information channeled from the visual and auditory
association areas20.
The polymodal character of temporal lobe auras is
thus precisely due to the mechanism that lays down the
memory trace—when the memory is retrieved, it sur-
faces with the consciousness that was ‘buried’ with it.
Gloor20 postulates that the temporal lobes may in fact
only be the trigger points for memory: the informa-
tion may exist in a distributed fashion over the entire
cortex, with the limbic structures only organizing stor-
age and retrieval. Concurrent activation of the thala-
mus presumably lends these retrieved modalities their
personal significance.
488 G. P. Kalamangalam
The cerebral cortex of the frontal lobe is less epilep-
togenic than the temporal lobe; frontal lobe epilepsy
is therefore a rarer entity and less well studied. It is
also particularly clinically challenging; the ictal semi-
ologies are varied and bizarre, and even intensive in-
vestigation is sometimes inconclusive. From the point
of view of consciousness, however, some subtypes
of frontal lobe seizures seem to illustrate instructive
counterexamples to temporal lobe epilepsy. Nonclas-
sical mesiofrontal seizures24 may include tonic, dys-
tonic, flailing or thrashing movements of the hemi-
body; dorsolateral spread may cause contraversive eye
and head movements and a fluent aphasia. To an ob-
server, consciousness will appear to be impaired. Nev-
ertheless, these seizures could be described as sim-
ple partial seizures; the patient is accurately able to
relate intervening events and recall commands pre-
sented during the seizure—he is only unable to re-
spond during the ictus. Seizures arising in the ante-
rior cingulate gyrus appear equally dramatic: shout-
ing, screaming and aggressive behaviour are usual.
(Destructive lesions of the anterior cingulate, on the
other hand, lead to akinetic mutism25. There is se-
vere poverty of speech and motor behaviour: a re-
covered patient recalled her akinetic and mute state,
saying she had not spoken because ‘there was noth-
ing to say’ and ‘nothing mattered’26.) Again, cingu-
late seizures could be simple: the behavioural man-
ifestations represent a form of consciousness that is
‘overdriven’ (in comparison with the ‘underdriven’
akinetic mute state) but fundamentally unaltered. Pre-
frontal seizures, on the other hand, lead to a rapid loss
of awareness or consciousness. The prefrontal cortex
has direct connections with the dorsomedial thalamus,
temporal and parietal cortices; one may speculate that
it is the thalamic connections that mediate the alter-
ation of awareness—indeed prefrontal focal epilepsy
may have 3 per second spike-wave EEG characteris-
tics24.
• Observation 4: In addition to global hierarchi-
cal properties, consciousness has modular struc-
ture. For example, long-term explicit memory and
its associated cognitive accompaniments reside in
the medial temporal lobe and medial diencephalon
and their connections. Complex behaviours also
have cortical representations; they may occur
within, or without, conscious awareness (presum-
ably depending on the degree of thalamic partici-
pation).
SPECIAL SEIZURE TYPES: COGNITION
Most neuroscientists would endow animals with a cer-
tain consciousness—wakefulness, awareness, mem-
ory, affect and even self-awareness (witness your dog
placidly walk by your neighbour, but bark ferociously
at his pet). Human consciousness is, however, distin-
guished by (among other things) the capacity for ab-
stract ideation and aesthetics. It is perhaps extraordi-
nary that epilepsy should intrude here too. Epilepsy
provoked by cognitive activity is rather rare, but the
syndromes are distinctive and rich in phenomenologi-
cal structure.
Reading epilepsy is a condition characterized by
seizures precipitated by the act of reading. It is a het-
erogeneous condition, usually appearing in the adult
years; seizures may be precipitated by the act of read-
ing, or by one of several alternative visual provoca-
tions27. The epilepsy may be primary or secondary
to a structural lesion; the EEG is typically normal
interictally and shows a generalized spike-wave pat-
tern during the ictus; alternatively, there may be a
well-defined EEG focus even interictally27. Given the
small (and clinically variable) number of cases re-
ported to date, there is a lack of consensus regarding
underlying mechanisms. In a proportion of the cases,
though, there is clear evidence that the provocation is
the higher cognitive activity associated with the read-
ing, and not the mechanical aspects of it (scanning eye
movements, jaw movements if reading aloud, etc.).
Geshwin and Sherwin28 in fact reported an exclusive
language-related epilepsy—reading, writing or talking
induced seizures. Linguists (e.g. Ref. 29) see the pro-
cess of reading as the dynamic interaction of modular
subsystems, involving basic vision, meaning extrac-
tion, comprehension and motor speech, in addition to
other cortical mechanisms of attention and short-term
memory. Some of these faculties have known cortical
localizations; the process of reading requires orches-
tration of these topographically disparate functional
subunits. An ‘epileptogenic’ connection anywhere in
the network serves to predispose to seizures during the
act.
Seizures induced by thinking and spatial tasks, on
the other hand, are a subtype of the primary gen-
eralized epilepsies30. These patients have the clini-
cal picture of juvenile absence, or juvenile myoclonic
epilepsy; mathematical thinking or visuospatial tasks
are a predictable provocation for seizures. Contrasted
with Gerstmann’s syndrome (dysgraphia, finger ag-
nosia, right–left disorientation and dyscalculia result-
ing from dominant parietal lobe disease), this vari-
ety of epilepsy is intriguing: the complete absence of
parietal lobe abnormalities on neuroimaging and EEG
does however seem to be the case30.
Seizures triggered by music (musicogenic epilepsy)
invariably occur in the context of symptomatic
localization-related epilepsy arising from the temporal
lobe31. It is clear that this is not a simple audiogenic
reflex epilepsy: the seizures of musicogenic epilepsy
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require the complex tonal, rhythm and harmonic pat-
terns of music for their precipitation (often highly spe-
cific for individual patients). Music is processed by the
auditory association areas in the temporal lobe; recent
evidence32 points to a multimodular processing struc-
ture that is distributed between both cortices.The su-
perior temporal gyrus houses most of the key process-
ing modules; bilateral damage to this structure may
rob a person of music appreciation (‘amusia’33) while
leaving all other auditory capabilities intact. The na-
ture of musicogenic epilepsy means that the condition
has not been reported in ‘tone-deaf’ individuals (in-
deed, in one series, a large fraction of the patients were
of above average musical ability); one may speculate
whether it can, in fact, ever occur in people without
music discrimination.
For the epileptologist, the existence of the cognition-
related epilepsies is the clearest link between brain and
mind. Some aspects of the mind are seen to reside in
defined anatomical areas—music processing in the su-
perior temporal gyrus, for instance (Observation 4).
Reading and mathematical thinking would seem more
diffusely represented. This difficulty raises two gen-
eral, and important, themes: (i) does the failure of lo-
calization of certain cognitive modules imply a nonex-
istence of dedicated single centres for these faculties?
Or, do these centres exist, but are too subtle, numer-
ous or scattered to be resolved by currently available
imaging/EEG techniques? (ii) Alternatively, does the
concept of localization itself run aground? That is, are
some properties of the brain ‘emergent’ (that is, de-
pendent on the integrity of the brain as a whole), or
effectively so?
These are difficult questions; while the observations
of epilepsy help to pose them, they offer no obvi-
ous solutions. It may be that as functional imaging
techniques become more widespread, more accurate
‘maps’ of cortical activation during cognitive tasks
will provide (or exclude) some answers.
• Observation 5: The global and modular elements
of consciousness may together produce a third to-
pography: ‘emerging’ cognitive properties from
the interaction of numerous widely distributed fo-
cal units.
THE POST-SURGICAL EPILEPTIC
Those who come to epilepsy surgery enable the study
of cognition in the absence of large, confluent ar-
eas of the brain. An insight in the early days of
epilepsy surgery was that of brain plasticity: some
patients seemed to suffer no obvious deficit follow-
ing removal of even significant areas of cortex. It
appeared as though the epileptogenic tissue’s func-
tional role had been taken over, even prior to opera-
tion, by normally functioning areas of cortex. In other
cases, post-operative neurological deficits disappeared
with time—most dramatically, speech was observed to
transfer to the minor hemisphere following dominant
hemispherectomy in children under the age of ten.
The operation of corpus callosotomy contributes
a unique condition to neurology: the ‘split-brain’
patient. Experiments on post-surgical patients in the
1960s, when the first of these operations were per-
formed for intractable epilepsy, demonstrated the lat-
erality of cognitive function dependent on visual hemi-
field and tactile tasks (i.e. senses that are not bilater-
ally represented). It appeared as though each hemi-
sphere had its own set of cognitive abilities, though
only the dominant one could communicate this to the
outside world. For instance, the articulate dominant
hemisphere would deny the existence of a visual stim-
ulus presented to the minor hemisphere; the patient
could nevertheless correctly pick up a matching ob-
ject (from a random selection) with his nondominant
hand. The differential abilities of the hemispheres also
became apparent: the dominant one possessed speech
and analytic thought; the minor one appeared superior
in nonverbal ideation and visuospatial ability. This no-
tion is still held to be approximately valid, though sub-
sequent experimentation has blurred these distinctions
somewhat34.
Despite their cognitive deficits, the striking feature
of split-brain patients is that they appear to the ca-
sual observer as the same ‘person’ they were prior
to surgery. They are observed to feel, think and re-
spond as before; 2 years after surgery, they may go
through a complete routine medical examination with-
out a hitch, and score at their presurgical level in ver-
bal IQ tests34. Additionally, they feel introspectively
unchanged. These observations have prompted those
who believe in the fundamental unity of a conscious
self to assert that consciousness must therefore largely
reside in subcortical structures. In part, this assertion is
correct. The semantic and emotional aspects of stimuli
presented to either hemisphere are sensed by the op-
posite partner via subcortical connections leading to a
fundamental unity of consciousness in terms of orien-
tation, attitude and affect. It is nevertheless true that
each hemisphere possesses its own private conscious-
ness; under appropriate testing conditions, each can be
made to respond in separate (and even contradictory)
ways34.
More recent experiments on split-brain subjects sug-
gest a further property of the dominant hemisphere,
that of being the ‘interpreter’35. This view envisages
conscious faculties existing in both hemispheres, but
the dominant hemisphere assigning an interpretation
to conscious constructs. This is strikingly brought
out in experiments where commands are presented
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to the minor hemisphere, e.g. ‘laugh’. The subject
predictably laughs, but the communicative dominant
hemisphere has been denied knowledge of the com-
mand. When the subject is then asked why he laughed,
the articulate dominant hemisphere is compelled to
confabulate: the subject says something like ‘I just
thought of something funny’. Gazzaniga35 draws per-
suasive conclusions about consciousness from such
experiments. Taken together with phenomena such as
‘blindsight’ (the presence of demonstrable visual func-
tion in the absence of conscious visual awareness),
this indicates a fundamental mode of operation of
the mind. Cerebral processes are themselves invisi-
ble to conscious awareness; only selected ‘products’
of cerebral processing reach conscious appreciation,
and these may localize to either hemisphere (or be
shared by them). The dominant hemisphere addition-
ally constructs a belief system that organizes all con-
scious experience: in the absence of direct informa-
tion of a particular conscious experience (such as aris-
ing from a disconnected minor hemisphere), it takes a
‘best guess’.
• Observation 6: Split-brain patients demonstrate
two parallel modes of conscious existence that are
linked at deeper cognitive levels through subcor-
tical structures. The cognitive functions executed
by the two hemispheres can be approximately con-
trasted as ‘analytic’ (dominant) and ‘synthetic’
(minor). The orderliness and predictability of con-
scious existence may arise from special process-
ing modules in the dominant, ‘interpretive’ hemi-
sphere.
SUMMARY: OPEN QUESTIONS
Observations 1–6 indicate what epilepsy may teach
about certain objective aspects of consciousness. The
nested faculties of wakefulness, awareness and con-
scious awareness are properties that arise from the in-
teraction of large areas of the cortex with subcortical
structures. Specific cognitive skills, on the other hand,
may have a dedicated topography; nevertheless, it is
the projection of these ‘eloquent’ foci to other areas of
the cortex and subcortex that gives them their over-
all ability, context, associations and personal mean-
ing. Other cognitive attributes have no known localiza-
tion; one may speculate whether these arise from a dis-
tributed and emergent neural processing architecture.
Elucidating consciousness is perhaps most success-
ful for the objective aspects of localized function.
These are to a degree sufficiently ‘explained’ by the
presence of dedicated cognitive processing modules
for them—it is straightforward, for instance, to con-
ceive of a computer algorithm to perform them (how-
ever complicated that may be to practically imple-
ment). The possession of these faculties by a conscious
being, therefore, may be little more than the evolution
of a specific portion of cerebrum that executes the ap-
propriate ‘software’. Where the issue of consciousness
becomes difficult (or even impossible) are the subjec-
tive aspects of both global and local attributes. On a
pragmatic level, the subjective and objective aspects
can be dissociated, and the latter still studied usefully.
This has been the tenor of this article, and forms the
basis for meaningful communication between those
who study the subject36.
Two profound, but potentially tractable, problems
remain largely unresolved at the present time. It is
not even clear where the solutions will come from—
biology, physics or computational science; such being
the case, the epileptologist has an equal chance as any!
The first is the so-called ‘perceptual binding’ prob-
lem. We have seen that consciousness has certain
global, overall aspects; yet several different modular
subsystems exist. Visual processing, for instance, oc-
curs at no less than thirty-odd primary and associa-
tion areas distributed over the whole brain. Even as-
suming the thalamus plays its role in imbuing a visual
scene with the observers participation in it (Property C
as before), one is left with the problem of explaining
how the outputs of so many processors finally comes
up with one, coherent visual percept. One may enlarge
the question to the whole of self-consciousness—how
does a single mental construct of a ‘self’ operating
in an external environment arise from the hundreds
of subprocesses in the brain? (Postulating a single
‘centre’—the so-called Cartesian theatre—where all
these subprocesses come together begs the question
of who then ‘sees’ this college—and how.) The neu-
rophysiological mechanism of gamma oscillations—
neuronal synchrony faster than 40 Hertz—has been
put forward as the ‘glue’ that binds the features of
a percept together. These oscillations have been ob-
served in disparate areas of the nervous system dur-
ing a single cognitive or sensory task37; the epilep-
tologist recognizes these as a postulated mechanism
for seizure spread as well. If this theory holds, the un-
derstanding of seizure spread will have profound im-
plications for cognitive science. The second problem
concerns creativity: how does the brain come up with
something original? How did the immensely compli-
cated (but nevertheless deterministic) neuronal net-
work comprising Mozart’s brain compose a sequence
of melodies and harmonies that had never been heard
before in human history (Symphony 40)?
Theories of consciousness touching on the above is-
sues by philosophers (e.g. Ref. 38) or physicists (e.g.
Ref. 39) flourish in the popular literature. Yet, the var-
ied clinical material confronting the epilepsy-oriented
neurologist offers a surely unique perspective. The ad-
Epilepsy and consciousness 491
vancement of that perspective may be critical if con-
vincing answers are to be found.
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